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A Treatise on the Anglo-A merican System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law,
inchding the statutes and judicial decisions of all jurisdictions of the United
States and Canada. By John Henry Wigmore. In five volumes. Boston,
Little, Brown & Company, 1923. pp. lxxxvi, 1i4o; xxxvi, io6g; xxxiv, ioo2;
xxxii, 972; xxx, 1141.
The publication of the first edition of this epoch-making work in 1904-I9o5 Put
at the disposal of the legal profession the most exhaustive, scientific and scholarly
treatise ever written upon the subject of evidence. It is no cyclopaedic text-book
with a jumble of conflicting statements, supported by bare citation of cases. On
the contrary, each doctrine is subjected to a critical and illuminating examination
from the viewpoints of history, reason, policy and authority. Copious quotations
from opinions of courts, legal scholars and philosophers lend force and interest to
the discussion; and the author makes clear his own views, taking care, where
necessary, to distinguish them from the rules applied by contemporary tribunals.
In spite of its novel arrangement and its frequently unusual terminology, it has
achieved the place its great merit deserves in the esteem of the bench and bar.
The law teacher, the practising lawyer, the trial judge, the court of last resort
may disagree with Mr. Wigmore, but they cannot afford to ignore the results of
his industry and scholarship. And the reports of the appellate courts since 19o5
demonstrate to what a remarkable extent this greatest authority upon the subject
has aided in the exposition of the law as it was and is, and in making it what it
ought to be. But no matter how well any work on any procedural topic may be
done, it will need revision after a period of nearly twenty years. Consequently,
the profession has been impatiently awaiting a second edition of Wigmore on
Evidence.
A worth-while nev edition of any law book should contain a revision of the text
so as to reflect the changes required by new decisions and statutes and to include
necessary additions; a thorough re-examination, in the light of further study and
of recent judicial opinion, of doctrines previously advanced; citation of important
cases decided since the prior edition; and a collection of pertinent statutes.
That Mr. Wigmore has revised his text is shown by changes in phraseology and
by quotations from very recent opinions of courts and of writers on legal subjects,
in many sections. In some of these, a change in personal opinion is indicated; and
frequently a new trend in judicial thought is pointed out. The following para-
graphs have'been added:
Rules of Evidence before Industrial Commissions, Public Utilities Commissions,
and other Administrative Officials (secs. 4a-4c); Rules of Evidence in Admiralty
Courts, Military Courts, Juvenile Courts, Commercial Courts (sec. 4d); Rules
of Evidence before Arbitrators, Clubs, Fraternities, etc. (sec. 4e) ; Rules of
Evidence in Social Case-Work (sec. 4g); Altering the Rules of Evidence by
Contract (sec. 7a); Tags, Signs, Number-Plates, as evidence of Identity of
Automobiles, Railroad-Cars, etc. (sec. 1soa); Finger-Prints and Footmarks as
evidence of Identity (secs. 151a, 414, 415) ; Physiological Traits as evidence of
Paternity (sec. x65) ; Convictions of Crime, used against an Accused under the
English Act of 1898 (sec. Ig4a) ; Insane Belief, as shown by Facts told to the
Party (secs. 262, 263) ; Other Offences as evidence of Intent in Sale or Prescrip-
tion of Drugs and Narcotics (sec. 368) ; Other Utterances as evidence of Intent
in Treason, Sedition, or Conspiracy (secs. 369, 370, 465); Method of securing
Unbiased Experts (secs. 563, 2484) ; Wife's Testimony in Desertion Cases (secs.
617, 2239); Adoptive Parent's Testimony to Adoptive Child's Age (see. 667);
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Information obtained by Dictagraph (sec. 669); Expert Witness reading a
Prepared Report (secs. 740, 787, 1385) ; Moving-Picture Photographs in Evidence
(sec. 798); Continuous Interrogation under Arrest ("Sweat-box," "Third
Degree") (sec. 851); Psychological Testimony to Deficiencies of Testimonial
Capacity to Observe or Remember (secs. 935, 990) ; Producing the Original of a
Registered Title (secs. 1225, 1647); Records and Certificates of Vital Statistics
(secs. 1336, i644) ; Records of Indian Tribal Blood in Land Titles (sec. 1347) ;
Certificates of Chemical Analysis of Foods and Fertilizers (secs. 1352, 1674);
Interpreters for Alien Witnesses (sec. 1393) ; Reputation to evidence Recognition
of Illegitimate Child (sec. 16o6); Reputation to evidence Keeping a Place for
Illegal Sale of Liquor or Drugs (sec. i62o) ; Certificates of Service in Army and
Navy (sec. i675a); Hospital Records (sec. 17o7); Common Carrier's Records of
Liquor Transported (sec. i7o8) ; Discovery of Premises and Chattels in Criminal
Cases, Exhumation of Corpse, etc. (secs. 1863, 2194, 2224); Corroborating a
Claimant of Prior Invention of a Patent (sec. 2o65a) ; Producing Eye-Witnesses
of a Personal Injury (sec. 2o81a) ; Producing Medical Testimony in Malpractice
Cases (sec. 2,o9o); Evidence obtained by Illegal Search for Liquor, etc. (sec.
2184) ; Compelling Depositions for Use in Another State (sec. 2195) ; Witness'
Exemption from Liability to Arrest (sec. 2195); Witness' Privilege not to
Disclose Premises, Chattels, etc. (sec. 2216); Privilege against Self-Crimination
for Books and Reports (Motorists, Druggists, etc.) required by law to be made
(secs. 2259c, 2259d); Witness' Immunity from Self-Crimination (sec. 2282);
Privilege for Communications to State Prosecutor (sec. 2375); Privilege for
Communications to Judge, Conciliator, etc. (sec. 2376); Privilege for Business
Reports (Taxes, Industrial Accidents, etc.) (sec. 2377) ; Privilege for Physician's
Certificate of Death (sec. 2385a) ; Parol Evidence of Agreement to Treat Copy
as Original (sec. 2449); Burden of Proof of Ownership of Automobile (see.
25ioa).
Of the foregoing but few require notice. Most of them merely indicate the
author's well-known alertness to discover very modern applications of settled rules,
and the possible effect of newly established truths in other branches of science
upon the administration of justice in the courts. The first three, however, demand
a word of warning. They must be read with the title of the treatise in mind. As
material supporting Mr. Wigmore's contentions that the common law rules of
evidence are, conceivably, not absolutely essential to the ascertainment of truth
and that, in the absence of the jury, most of them could be disregarded without
serious damage to the cause of justice, they are excellently done. But should the
reader expect to find these subjects so thoroughly developed as to make the text a
complete guide to practice before the tribunals in question, he will be disappointed.
The fifth is done in the author's best fashion.
In section 2184 Mr. Wigmore elaborates the views which he formerly expressed
concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. With his characteristic vigor he denounces the now prevailing rule as due to
"misguided sentimentality," and attempts to link it in some indirect and indefinite
way with the invocation of that Amendment during the war by the "misguided
pacifistic or semi-pro-German interests." But can these decisions of the Courts
be attributed to sentiment? Is it not rather a question of policy, the answer to
which must be based upon unascertained data? Is the exclusion of such evidence
the practicable method of enforcing the Fourth Amendment? If so, is it more
important that the Fourth Amendment be enforced than that Government offi-
cials be permitted to use the easiest method of securing convictions for viola-
tions of various statutes, and particularly of the Volstead Act? Surely these
questions can be answered without an appeal to sentiment, and the judges are as
likely to guess right as the author, inasmuch as both judges and author must
reach their conclusions without accurate data based upon experience. In some-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
what similar manner objection may be taken to the criticism in section 85I of
the exclusion of confessions obtained by the "sweat box" or "third degree"
method. The courts are confronted with a very practical problem. Rarely
do the police use physical violence or direct threats of bodily harm to. extract
confessions; but devices of more refined cruelty, having much greater tendency
than threats of violeice to "make a confession, irrespective of its truth, more
desirable than silence with its contingencies," are constantly"employed. And
the judges know it, despite published statements of prominent chiefs of police
to the contrary. And until legislative action makes such interrogation by the
police unnecessary or impossible by substituting for it, as Mr. Wigmore suggests,
interrogation by an examining magistrate, the exclusionary rule may as properly
be attributed to a realization of the facts as to an ignoring of them.
It is to be regretted that the author has not either in section 5 or in book II
given the profession the benefit of his opinion upon the vexed problem, whether
burden of proof should be governed by those rules which ordinarily govern
procedure or by those which ordinarily govern substance. And it would have
been much more satisfactory had he inserted a section dealing with the applica-
tion of the ordinary rules of evidence to proof of preliminary matters necessary
to enable the judge to rule upon the admissibility of evidence, instead of content-
ing himself with an incidental statement in section 1385 to the effect that they
do not apply. Section 4g could well have been spared to make room for one
of his scholarly discussions of either of these topics.
No doubt Mr. Wigmore has given all the doctrines advanced in his first edition
a much more thorough re-examination than the new work on its face indicates.
Frequent references in the footnotes to discussions in legal periodicals and else-
where, wherein the writers disagree with his treatment of specific topics, denote
that he must have considered them only to reject them. And in some instances
he has modified his former opinions. His theory of presumptions' and their
effect upon the burden of proof he has retained; nor has he made any reference
to the enlightening article upon the subject in (1920) 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307-321
by Professor Francis H. Bohlen. If all the courts would adopt Mr. Wigmore's
theory, they would find it logical and easy of application. A presumption would
affect only the burden of going forward; it could have no effect upon the risk
of non-persuasion. It would be beautifully simple. Unfortunately many courts
have allowed their ideas of expediency and policy to overbalance their regard
for the simple and logical, and have given certain presumptions a very definite
effect upon the risk of non-persuasion. Professor Bohlen's article deals with
the considerations of expediency and policy which have impelled such courts
to this result; and his views cannot be ignored in any critical examination of
the subject. Obviously, there is nothing inherent in the nature of a presump-
tion which prevents it from influencing the risk of non-persuasion or from
making it shift during the course of a trial from one party to the other. This
entire topic needs such a complete and exact reconsideration as Mr. Wigmore
is well qualified to make; and it is a disappointment not to find it accomplished
in this new edition.
Again, in his treatment of the parol evidence rule he adheres, without modifica-
tion or elaboration, to his analysis of the cases which admit and give operative
effect to oral agreements that certain writings shall not be binding upon the
parties until the happening of a condition; and he completely overlooks a
searching criticism of this analysis by Professor Arthur L. Corbin in (igig)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 764-768. Such a challenge of the very basis of this
portion of the discussion ought not to have been passed unnoticed.
The present edition cites some I5,ooo additional cases, and brings the pertinent
statutory law up to date. The collection of statutes alone would justify the
new edition. Application of the ordinary tests shows the present table of cases
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to be adequate and accurate; and "the list of statutes cited" will be of great
assistance, especially to the local practitioner. Other practical mechanical
improvements have been made in typography and arrangement It is a pity
that the work is not provided with a comprehensive index. An index of topics
is furnished, but it is not sufficiently detailed to meet the needs of the busy
lawyer.
Perhaps this review has expected too much of Mr. Wigmore. Had anyone
else prepared this second edition, it would have accorded him unalloyed praise
for patient, scholarly, accurate workmanship, and would have called upon his
head unmixed blessings for having furnished the profession an up-to-date
edition worthy of the original masterpiece. And there is no intention of giving
the impression that the work is seriously defective. Its virtues so far out-
number its faults as to make the latter seem almost negligible. It is so far
superior to any other treatise on the subject that comparison is impracticable.
It is by all odds the best, if not the only real, authority on the law of Evidence.
E. M. MORGAN
Yale University School of Law
Hispanic-Aierican Relations with the United States. By William Spencer
Robertson. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York, Oxford
University Press, American Branch, 1923. pp. xii, 470.
The book gives a review, from an Anglo-American viewpoint, of the different
forms in which the United States influences the political, commercial, industrial,
educational and scientific life of Spanish-America. The topic of these relations
has been so long obscured by misrepresentations that a rectification seems neces-
sary to remove one of the obstacles to the Spanish-American peoples raising their
living standard and their productive and consuming capacity. To do this is to
render a service intended to bring about the most fruitful dealings of the United
States with the countries of the South, even though that service is cloaked in the
language of unpleasant truths.
The misunderstanding comes from both sides: from the Anglo-Americans, on the
one hand, by looking with contempt upon whatever originates in Spain, and on the
other hand, by exaggerating the qualities of their public men as if they were super-
human beings, above the level of the saints of the Church, who in many cases were
originally great sinners, and by exaggerating the merits of their institutions so
that they appear not as the outgrowth of circumstances, but as a divine invention
of superhuman minds creating by themselves and maintaining the prosperity of
this country, a doctrine which can and must be applied everywhere, irrespective of
circumstances. The Spanish-Americans, in turn, either blinded by the wonders
of those exaggerations, are unable to use their own judgment and only worship
the people of the North, despise their own and make awkward obnoxious imita-
tions; or, preferring flattery with its personal benefit to truth with its social
healthfulness, refrain from uttering their inner thoughts; or, if moved by political
or financial purposes, make the most emphatic praises of the Anglo-American men
and institutions; their words are quoted wiih fruition by Anglo-American writers,
and so the evil grows manifoldedly.
Sometimes an angry voice of criticism is raised in Spanish-America against the
United States, but anger does not help any purpose. An honest but critical
writer seldom has a forum. What we badly need is facts and equanimity to face
the conclusions of sound common sense.
The author repeats the old list of charges against the rule of Spain in America:
commercial monopoly and religious intolerance, without giving her credit for the
unsurpassed wisdom and ideals of her laws and methods of government of her
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colonies. He should have said in fairness that commercial monopoly was a
universal colonial policy of those times, less strictly enforced by Spain than by
England; and that intolerance of any kind exists in all the countries of the
world where the conflict of opinions among large portions of the people has not
shown scepticism.
As the author says, the influence of the United States is evident in Spanish-
America, among other facts, by the imitation of its political constitution. But
for any person of scientific training law is either the outgrowth of life, contributing
to the happiness of the people, or a distortion of life with subsequent endless
sufferings. An imitated constitution is a destructive lie inlaid in the heart of a
country, and Anglo-American writers, with their political experience, should warn
other countries against such a blunder.
Let us take the case of Mexico: In order to imitate the United States, Mexican
law makers created the childish fiction that some geographic subdivisions of their
country, which so far was a unit, were sovereign states that entered into a federal
pact. The first effect of this was to give Texas an opportunity to secede from
Mexico, claiming her fictitious sovereignty, which fact ultimately brought a war
of conquest waged by the United States, in which Mexico lost more than half her
territory. The lack of majority in the population of India has rendered England
unable to organize there a democracy. Mexico under similar circumstances
proclaimed a democratic government, seeking to imitate the United States. But
Mexico has only seen anarchy or monarchies of revolutionary origin; democracy
is there a mere word without any other meaning than irresponsibility or tyranny;
the people are thus kept restless, impoverished, incapacitated to contribute morally
or financially to the prosperity of this continent. This can also be said of other
Spanish-American countries of similar social composition.
The effects of the Monroe Doctrine are then studied by the author. Facts again
are essential.
"With governments whose independence," said President Monroe, "we have
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing
them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the
United States." This unrestricted statement was soon limited by declaring that
the United States would be neutral in the struggles between the European mother
countries and their revolted colonies of America, even though the United States
had acknowledged their independence. This limitation practically saved the
United States all the responsibilities of Monroe's unqualified declaration. Had
Spain at that time not been so weakened by her wars with Napoleon, or her
colonies not so determined to fight for their independence, the Monroe Doctrine
would have been meaningless, as the United States did not contribute to that
independence. In 1824 Argentina asked whether the Monroe declaration would
bind the United States to help in case a European power was assisting an Ameri-
can country waging war against another country of this continent. Secretary Clay
in 1828 answered that only the Congress could decide in such a case; a declaration
which was tantamount to denying that the President had any power to commit
the country to the defence of any international doctrine.. In 1829 Spain sent an
army to reconquer Mexico; the army was defeated by Mexico without any help.
Spain recovered several islands along the coast of Peru, until Peruvian and
Chilean forces, after many years, expelled the Spaniards. In 1838 France
bombarded and occupied Vera Cruz. In none of these cases was the Monroe
Doctrine mentioned.
In 1862 Napoleon III, with the avowed purpose of checking the influence of the
United States in America, and believing the secession of the South from the
Union was a fait accompli, planned to make Mexico a strong buffer State by
helping the conservatives. A French army was sent to Mexico, and the United
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States, far from invoking the Monroe Doctrine, allowed General Forey to buy
mules and wagons in New Orleans, thus violating the neutrality against Mexico,
and the Monroe Doctrine. Napoleon met with strong opposition in his own
country; he soon realized the financial difficulties of the venture when, in April,
1866, a loan badly needed by the Mexican Empire hardly succeeded with Napoleon's
recommendation; the political situation of Europe grew complicated, and finally
the basis of the whole Napoleonic scheme failed by the triumph of the American
Union against the South. Then Napoleon ordered his troops not to advance any
further in Northern Mexico. Later the American government sent to France a
note showing dissatisfaction with her intervention in Mexico, and Napoleon made
public his decision to withdraw his troops, fixing the year 1867 for leaving Mexico.
Secretary Seward acquiesced in this delay; had he shown more appreciation of
the sacrifices of Mexican soldiers opposing an enterprise directed against the
United States, the loss of thousands of Mexican lives and millions of Mexican
money during two years could have been spared, as Generals Sheridan and
Butterfield among other Americans declared at that time.
In 1884 Venezuela asked the assistance of the United States to recover a large
part of her territory invaded by England. Eleven years later President Cleve-
land appointed a commission to investigate the facts. England, at that time
politically embarrassed, consented to arbitrate, the result being that most of her
conquest was sanctified and the Monroe Doctrine overlooked.
Venezuela, again, after refusing to submit to arbitration some claims of
Germany and England, saw her ports blockaded by those countries. The United
States interfered, and Venezuela agreed to arbitrate the case.
These precedents and the fact that the Monroe Doctrine was not mentioned in
the Versailles treaty, but vaguely alluded to as "local understandings" called for
a statement of its real meaning, which Secretary Hughes made before the
American Bar Association. According to his declaration, the Monroe Doctrine
concerns only the United States and its protection, even though the other countries
of America may eventually derive benefit or detriment thereby, as they could for
instance from a tariff law. Considering the Monroe Doctrine this way, it
contains nothing new; all the countries of the world have always claimed the
right to protect themselves. The peculiarity of the Monroe Doctrine, so under-
stood, lies in the weakness of the Spanish-American countries, which allows the
United States to protect itself not only against actual invasions of her territory,
but against the possibility of one, and this notwithstanding she invades the
sovereignty of other countries of this continent (case of Magdalena Bay), and
not only against dangers to her territorial integrity, but in cases of mere nuisances
which may disturb one part of her people (cases of Haiti and Santo Domingo).
What is meant in each case by nuisance? Only the White House has the definition.
Secretary Hughes, to calm the natural apprehensions of the Spanish-American
countries, added that there is nothing aggressive in the Doctrine, and I think that
those countries may believe he is right, as long at least as they behave as good
children in the opinion of the American government, or until they have dread-
noughts enough to support their own definition of the word nuisance.
The economic effects of the political influence of the United States on her
sister republics are generally overlooked, though they are the more important.
European investors consider the Monroe Doctrine as an obstacle to collect from
debtor Spanish-American countries; this means that those countries have to pay
a higher rate of interest, thus contributing their money for the support of a
doctrine which does not concern them and for an undefined protection that they
do not demand. This in the long run means American monopoly of the money
market in the continent and its consequences for the economic independence of
Spanish-America. On the other hand, unscrupulous politicians of Spanish-
America construe the Monroe Doctrine as a protection against any interference
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of the European countries in behalf of their citizens; thus the moral curb for
those politicians, which that interference used to be, has disappeared; they feel at
liberty to seize and destroy foreign and native property without their own fellow
citizens being able to charge them with unpatriotic discrimination (case of the
Mexican revolution of 1913-16). After the country is laid waste in a way that
only irresponsibility can explain, the bill for damages is presented by other nations,
including the United States, and peaceful destituted people have to pay for that
unwelcome protection given to their spoilers.
How can a people so impoverished be a valuable element in the economic life of
the Western Hemisphere?
Important remarks could be made on those parts of the book dealing with
commerce and education, but they would require larger space than is permissible
in a review.
T. EsQuiVE. OB RaOI
New York City
A Guide to the Study of the History of English Law and Procedure. By
Clarence C. Crawford. Toronto, Carswell & Company, 1923. pp. viii, 83.
"This guide was prepared in the first instance to serve as an outline of lectures
and library reading"--so reads the prefatory note. In no spirit of disparage-
ment we may say that in its final form it still remains, in its principal charac-
teristics, what it was in the first instance.
There are twelve main divisional headings, of which the first four are devoted
to a general survey of constitutional and legal history, while the other eight are
concerned more directly with definite subjects of substantive law and procedure-
persons, property, tort, crime, and contract. The method followed in each
section is the same-a topical outline, usually with direct references to text-
writers or cases or statutes accompanying the topic, followed by a bibliography.
As to the latter the statement in the preface is correct--"while the bibliographies
are not exhaustive, they will serve as a guide to (much of) the best literature
on the subject." The topical outlines and the references therein contained are
even less exhaustive than the bibliographies. Obviously no attempt has been
made to go into anything like detail in regard to the points involved. To have
done so would have required many times the space which Professor Crawford
has allowed himself. It is this lack of detail which must inevitably limit the
usefulness of the book to lawyers and law teachers. But the very evident care
and industry which has produced this volume can hardly fail to make it, within
the limits which it has chosen for itself, a reliable guide for those whose interest
and concern is not on the side of technical details, but on the broader and more
general points of constitutional and legal history.
GEORGE E. WOODBINE
Yale University School of Law
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